Standing Committee D

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Homes Bill

Roger Gale: Good afternoon. I notice that the Committee has made rapid progress during my absence, which must say something. I am sure that we shall maintain both the fairness and the pace of the discussion this afternoon. Clause 22 Events which cause the duty to cease

Clause 22 - Events which cause the duty to cease

Amendment moved [this day]: No. 72, in page 13, line 16, at end insert 
`and states that the offer shall remain available to the applicant for not less than three working days from the date of the offer, or such longer period as the authority consider reasonable in all the circumstances.'.—[Mr. Don Foster.]

Don Foster: There will be an argument that my proposal could lead to an increase in the length of time that properties remain vacant. The average void time for local authority properties is currently six weeks. I believe that the amendment would not seriously alter that situation, about which many of us ought to be concerned and which should be addressed.
 Amendment No. 72 would allow a minimum of three days for a homeless household to decide whether to accept or reject a final offer. I think that I have made a fairly clear argument. In many cases, a shorter period gives the applicant insufficient opportunity to consider all the factors that may influence his decision. Those factors may relate to the impact on working life or to the education of any children who might be involved. The applicant may need to find out whether the landlord will improve any defects in the property. 
 As the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) pointed out in an earlier intervention, it would be unfair for any local authority to allow an applicant only 24 hours to make a decision. The hon. Gentleman, who was obviously shocked that such behaviour could exist, asked me to provide him with examples of councils that operated in that way. He will be disappointed to hear that, sadly, there are a number of such authorities. For example, in London alone, the London boroughs of Newham, Lambeth and Waltham Forest operate in that way. 
 The London borough of Southwark also operates the procedure, but allows the wonderful extension of an additional 48 hours if the applicant requests it, thereby increasing the period to three days. In Southwark, however, three days is the maximum, not the minimum, as I propose. 
 I could not confirm the precise arrangements, but it is understood that the London borough of Camden usually allows 48 hours and that the Royal borough of Kensington and Chelsea operates a similarly tight schedule. 
 We can look elsewhere in the country. I have been advised that many authorities in Suffolk and Essex operate a similar procedure and that some give less than 24 hours. In some authorities, the applicant is required to turn up almost immediately. When he arrives, he finds a housing officer on the doorstep with the tenancy agreement form and is required to complete it there and then. 
 The practice of very short notification does exist, but I genuinely believe that it must be stopped. We need to have a minimum time of three days for the reasons that I have given. That would be fair and right, and would meet the Labour party's specific commitments in its manifesto, in the housing Green Paper and in subsequent Labour party documents. I hope therefore to receive a positive response from the Minister. 
 I am delighted to see in his place my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Mr. Brake). I was sorry to hear that the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) is not feeling well at the moment; we wish him a speedy recovery so that he can at least join us for the last day of deliberations when, we understand, that both of the Ministers will have at last got their act together as to the name of the constituencies of hon. Members.

Roger Gale: Before we proceed, let me say that, in my haste to get proceedings under way apace this afternoon, I omitted two things. First, I add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. We wish him and his new family—and his old family—well. Secondly, I failed to notice that the hon. Member for Coventry, North-East (Mr. Ainsworth) has moved two paces smartly to his left, geographically of course, not politically. I congratulate him on his elevation; it is a pleasure to welcome the hon. Gentlemen to the usual challenge.

Oona King: I congratulate this Committee on perhaps being the most compassionate that I have ever come across, issuing more congratulations and condolences than any other that I have served on thus far.
 While I would not want to press the amendment to a vote, I would wish to press the Minister to reconsider the issue. In my own local authority of Tower Hamlets, we have a 24-hour deadline for homeless people. As we have heard, homeless households are among the most vulnerable, and often constituents turn down offers because they have only 24 hours to make a decision, and they are unable to get the advice that they need or be reassured that repairs that need to be done to the properties will be carried out. 
 One constituent told me that, when he went round to view a property, the body of the previous tenant had only been moved out an hour earlier, and it was on that basis that he rejected it as unsuitable. One can understand the problems that might arise with such haste. While I am concerned about meeting our targets for reducing the numbers of voids, we also have to try to meet our stated aims of increasing choice for homeless people and not having a policy that works through coercion, for want of a better word. If homeless families are to have only one offer, as is the case in Tower Hamlets, they should at least be able to seek better advice. 
 Shelter's research has shown that 76 per cent. of homeless families are lone parents, and I have many women coming to my surgery saying that they have turned down an offer as being unsuitable because they think it is wrong to have to step over a heroin addict to get to the lift. I have to explain to them that that does not come within the law but, if they are unable to get advice, they cannot make an informed decision. I do not wish to detain the Committee but we do need to look towards having a system that allows informed consent instead of the rush job that many homeless families have to deal with at the moment.

Bob Ainsworth: Thank you, Mr. Gale, for your congratulations and warm words on my geographical move to the left.
 I appreciate the intention behind this amendment, which is to ensure that, under part IV, applicants have a reasonable period in which to consider a final offer from a local housing authority. Applicants need time for deliberation, and possibly to consult relatives, friends or advisers on the options available. The hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Foster) has made some good points in relation to the time that it can take to explore educational opportunities in an area and to secure undertakings on repairs. 
 Those are important matters that enable applicants to make informed and sensible choices, but we must be careful not to burden the Bill with too much detail, which might obscure its principal purposes. In addition, I fear that the effect of legislating for a minimum period of three days would be to make three days a standard and, in effect, a maximum period as well. That would considerably worsen the situation in many local authorities. In most instances, three days would be too short a period: authorities need the flexibility to adapt to particular circumstances. 
 We recognise the problems that hon. Members have raised. Some authorities operate in far too restrictive and bureaucratic a way and are totally inflexible in their allocations policy. DETR research has been heavily quoted, but it only highlights the need for the legislation that we are here to discuss.

Nigel Waterson: Will the Minister give way?

Bob Ainsworth: Yes, all right.

Nigel Waterson: The Minister is allowed to say no, although it is not always advisable to do so. Does he agree that the difference between the practices of local authorities depends on the supply and demand equation in that area? If there is enormous demand for a relatively small supply, a short time scale may be appropriate; whereas authorities with lots of supply and relatively little demand can afford to take a slightly more relaxed approach.

Bob Ainsworth: That may be so and it is one of the reasons for not being over-restrictive. However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, three days is too short a period in which to expect a person to decide on a final offer.
 I was saying that local authorities can be too restrictive in their allocation policy, but I would say to the hon. Member for Bath and my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Ms King) who expressed some concern, that not everything is negative. More than 90 authorities have bid for funding to operate choice-based letting schemes—an excellent response that shows that local government recognises the need for change. We will evaluate the success of those schemes over the next couple of years and disseminate the lessons learned to promote good practice. I am confident that authorities will develop schemes that promote choice, but we will review their performance following the pilots and if progress is not satisfactory, we may have to look at the framework again. 
 It is also worth nothing that the substantial increases in capital investment that we are making will expand social housing stock in areas of greatest demand. That will make it easier for authorities to operate choice-based schemes, but it will not happen overnight. If the hon. Member for Bath thinks about the parts of the research that he quoted and the period in which it was shown that those restrictive practices had grown, he will see that it coincides with a period of falling capital investment. That is surely a big part of the problem. 
 The hon. Gentleman quoted from a number of authorities that he suggests are behaving badly, but his approach does not appear to have been totally comprehensive. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow is taking up the issues with her local authority in Tower Hamlets, so I suggest that the hon. Gentleman explores the policies in Bath and North East Somerset, which is controlled by the Liberal Democrats, as are Sheffield, Sutton and Islington. Perhaps the sin lists presented to the Committee should be more comprehensive to improve their credibility. 
 In making offers, authorities must act reasonably: demanding instant decisions is not reasonable and could be challenged. A three-day minimum, if built into primary legislation, could too easily become a standard or even a maximum. I have already given assurances about monitoring the pilots and taking any necessary action after they have been evaluated.

Don Foster: As the Minister is close to winding up his speech, will he put firmly on record his views regarding the authorities, including Bath and North East Somerset council, which currently operate a 24-hour policy? He has already made it clear that he regards three days as too short, so what does he think about 24 hours? Will the Minister tell us whether it is appropriate to urge those authorities to reconsider their actions?

Bob Ainsworth: I have already said that in the overwhelming majority of cases three days is unreasonable. The same applies—again in the majority of cases—to the alleged 24-hour deadline. However, it may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and we do not want to put into the legislation a specific limit that could become a standard or a maximum that put pressure on authorities that are behaving far better to lower their current standards.
 I hope that, with my assurances about monitoring the pilots and taking any necessary action, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment. If not, we shall have to vote against it.

Don Foster: I thank the Minister for his response and the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow for supporting the principle behind the amendments and for acknowledging that her local authority, Tower Hamlets, operates a similar policy. I was not seeking to hide one authority from another: I provided examples of all political persuasions in London.
 The Minister referred to the 90 bids for choice-based letting schemes. He will be aware that the Bath and North East Somerset council is concerned about its current procedures, which is why it is one of the 90. When the Minister reviews his decision on which bids to accept, I hope that he will take my council into account. We have an opportunity, by getting involved in the scheme, to help put right some of the problems that I have mentioned. 
 I understand the Minister's argument that building any time scale, such as a three-day minimum, into the Bill might lead the vast majority of authorities to regard it as the maximum. However, a maximum of three days—if that is what it became de facto—would still be better than the 24-hour system operated by many authorities; it would be progress of sorts. I accept the Minister's assurance that a 24-hour period is acceptable to the Government only in extreme circumstances. He acknowledged that people often need time for discussions with their friends, families and advisers about issues such as jobs, education, repairs and so forth in order to make an informed and sensible choice. 
 The amendment is not about all the different offers that might be given by an authority to a homeless family, but about the final offer. It is a serious decision to take in the knowledge that a subsequent appeal might not be successful. Some people have to take that decision with far too little time to reflect on it. Too many authorities adopt that practice. The Minister referred to some, but he was wrong to say that Bath and North East Somerset council is controlled by the Liberal Democrats. Sadly, that is not the case. I can assure the Minister, however, that we are not far short of overall control and that we are working hard to achieve it.

Tim Loughton: In your dreams.

Don Foster: The hon. Gentleman should not tempt me. The reality of Bath and North East Somerset council is that the Conservatives can only dream of gaining more than the two or three councillors that they currently have in my area. Over the years, Conservatives have been wiped off the face of the earth by excellent Liberal Democrat councillors.
 The Minister referred to councils that operate a 24-hour policy as being on the sin list—his phrase, not mine. I hope that that sin will be widely reported and that relevant authorities, including my own, will be advised to get their act together. The Minister spoke about the importance of taking informed and sensible decisions. I want to come to an informed and sensible decision about whether to take the matter further, and I require at least 24 hours to reflect further on it; therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 - Abolition of duty under section 197

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: Before the clause whizzes by at a rate of knots, I should like to raise a few points to which I am sure the new Minister will be delighted to respond—

Nick Raynsford: No, the old Minister.

Tim Loughton: I see, we are back to old Labour now.
 The clause deals with section 197 of the Housing Act 1996. It effectively repeals the local authority's duty not to secure accommodation, but to provide an applicant 
``with such advice and assistance as the authority consider is reasonably required'' 
to enable him to secure ``other suitable accommodation'' in the district. That provision will be replaced by a general duty to secure accommodation if nothing else suitable is available. 
 Shelter has expressed concern that the existing legislation has led to a wide variation in the standards and levels of advice and assistance provided by local authorities. It is very poor in places with applicants sent away with little more than a list of bed-and-breakfast locations. Shelter says: 
``the quality of advice and assistance is not necessarily dependent on the amount of stock available and there are numerous examples of good practice achieved in areas of high demand. 
 Likewise, there are authorities where, despite low housing demand, the level of assistance provided is poor.'' 
I share Shelter's hope for a more uniform and uplifted level of service for homeless people across the country. 
 How does the change in duties tally with the strategic multi-agency approach—according to the Government, the rationale for part II—particularly if other agencies within the strategic partnerships have access to accommodation? How does the new measure tally with the enhanced strategic advisory role that we debated in our proceedings this morning? How does it tally with efforts to reduce empty homes more logically and undogmatically? How does it work in districts where there is no local authority housing? Surely the key is to secure suitable housing for homeless, or potentially homeless people by whatever means possible. Might the measure not restrict that? Perhaps the old Minister would comment on some of those concerns.

Nick Raynsford: I, too, take the opportunity to extend my congratulations to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and welcome him back to our discussions.
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Mr. Loughton) asked a number of pertinent questions about how clause 23 tallies with the other measures in this part. The purpose of the clause is to remove section 197 of the 1996 Act, which was heavily criticised at its introduction and has subsequently proved problematic. To some extent, the hon. Gentleman conceded that in referring to the Shelter report, which highlighted the wide variations in the assistance provided by local authorities, which we fully accepted in the debate this morning. 
 Therefore, it is necessary to ensure there is an effective duty on local authorities towards people who are homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless. That duty is to secure that they obtain accommodation, or, if they are threatened with homelessness, that they do not cease to have accommodation. 
 The relationship with the multi-agency approach is clear. An individual who is threatened with homelessness can be assisted in a variety of ways, including through advice and assistance from a range of different agencies. Someone who is experiencing difficulty in budgeting may be helped by a welfare rights or money advice centre. I think of some of the examples that the hon. Members for East Worthing and Shoreham and for Eastbourne discussed, where individuals, possibly with a history of mental illness, are located in a block of flats where they could cause difficulties to neighbours. Good advice and support from social services may make it possible for such a tenancy to be sustained, which otherwise could be problematic. 
 That tallies well with the wider multi-agency approach, but it contains a long stop that ensures that the local authority has to secure accommodation and cannot simply say, ``We think that there may be enough alternative accommodation available. We will give you a list. Go out and find something for yourself.'' 
 That is not a satisfactory solution. 
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham asked how the measure would help to tackle the problem of empty properties. It will act as a further incentive to local authorities to explore effective means of getting every property available to them back into use. It will also encourage them to liaise with other providers in the area, such as registered social landlords and the private sector, on where lettings might be available. It will require an assured tenancy, not an assured shorthold tenancy. We will make some technical changes to subsequent clauses to give effect to that. Nevertheless, it is still possible for someone to be housed on an assured shorthold tenancy on an interim basis and then to transfer to an assured tenancy. The whole purpose of the policy is to secure permanent accommodation for homeless people, so that they are not caught in a revolving door of repeated homelessness, which can be extremely traumatic. 
 I apologise to the hon. Member, but I cannot recall his third question. If he reminds me of the content, I will happily try to answer it.

Tim Loughton: What about districts in which there is no local authority housing?

Nick Raynsford: I thank the hon. Gentleman. In cases where the authority has transferred its housing stock to another landlord, there has to be, as part of the transfer, an agreement with the receiving body, the registered social landlord, to accept nominations to enable the authority to meet its homelessness obligations. That contractual relationship between the local authority and the large-scale voluntary transfer authority—in some cases, the relationship could be with a number of other RSLs—is the mechanism by which the authority can refer homeless applicants to such accommodation.
 Certainly, as part of their homelessness strategy, which is dealt with in one of the earlier clauses of this Bill, it is obviously necessary for local authorities to ensure that they have good relationships and arrangements, whether contractual or simply a voluntary understanding, with registered social landlords in their area to enable them to have access to the necessary number of premises and to meet their obligations. 
 I hope that the Committee will accept this sensible clause . 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Abolition of duty to maintain housing register

Andrew Love: I beg to move amendment No. 81, in page 15, line 19, at end insert
`and is entitled to apply to a local housing authority for an allocation of housing accommodation.'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 82, in clause 26, page 16, line 36, at end insert
`, and, accordingly, a local housing authority's allocation scheme shall not be framed so as to exclude any person falling within section 160(A)(2).'.

Andrew Love: These amendments would strengthen the Bill by ensuring that local authorities cannot exclude eligible households from social housing at the point at which an application is made. In some ways, they are attached to amendment No. 83, which we shall be dealing with when we consider clause 27.
 Opposition Members have talked in glowing terms of the Housing Act 1996, section 161 of which has a number of stipulations. The first is that authorities have to draw a single housing register, on which only qualifying persons can be placed. Qualification can be related to statute—for example, it can include asylum seekers and those subject to immigration control. The Act also has an explicit power, which allows authorities, under their allocation scheme, to specify whole classes of persons that do not qualify to be put on the register. Local authorities have used this type of exclusion for many years. Since the introduction of that Act, there has been a significant expansion of the number of excluded persons, as a Shelter survey in 1998 confirmed. A favourite form of exclusion—used widely by local authorities in the case of people whom they already house seeking a transfer—is to exclude those in rent arrears. A recent Shelter survey showed that 89 per cent. of authorities exclude anyone seeking a transfer who is in arrears. 
 Of course there are other mechanisms to exclude people, including criminal conviction, anti-social behaviour—let me come back to that—and even those who have refused offers of accommodation from the local authority itself. Often, these restrictions are not justified by the individual circumstances in which people find themselves. Rent arrears are often caused by the inefficiencies of the housing benefit system. 
 RSLs concerned about the growing backlog of housing benefit payments are serving notices of possession on their tenants, not in order to scare their tenants but to push their local authority along to provide housing benefit. A consequence of that will be that many authorities will not allow their tenants or an RSL tenant to be re-housed because of the notice seeking possession. 
 We are also aware that local authorities sometimes use motoring offences as a reason to stop people being placed in housing. Of course, ``antisocial behaviour'' has a whole Pandora's box of interpretations, many of which are unjustified and unproven allegations.

Nigel Waterson: Surely the hon. Gentleman agrees that some of the most upsetting and intractable cases with which hon. Members have to deal are those involving people behaving antisocially towards their neighbours. A track record of significant antisocial behaviour—I am not talking about the odd explicable incident—should be taken into account. We could argue about the mechanism for doing that but it must be done, otherwise another set of neighbours would be condemned to the same problems.

Andrew Love: There is widespread recognition of the difficulties about which the hon. Gentleman speaks. If there is significant evidence of such a track record, perhaps involving a court case arising from antisocial behaviour, action must of course be taken. We would not wish all the neighbours of such a person to be blighted for many years.
 Many people who find themselves excluded by those blanket policies are in extreme need. Such policies work against the objectives of the Bill, which is supposed to take a preventive approach to homelessness. According to the housing Green Paper, we should continue to give priority to meeting housing need. Paragraph 9.13 states: 
 ``We do not believe that anyone should be permanently excluded from social housing. We therefore propose to remove the power to impose `blanket' exclusions from the housing register.'' 
Yet that is exactly what is happening. In its current form, the Bill will not effect significant changes to such behaviour, which is extremely widespread. The Shelter survey that I quoted earlier estimated that upwards of 200,000 people were excluded or suspended between 1996 and 1998. Only four of 65 housing organisations surveyed had a completely open register; all the others offered some form of exclusion. Of 74 housing authorities surveyed, a separate study showed that only 25 per cent. of those with an exclusion policy stipulated the length of that exclusion and limited it in any way—meaning that they could exclude people permanently. I agree with the argument in the Green Paper that reductions in priority or suspensions of applications for housing should occur only in exceptional circumstances and be applied individually. The current blanket policies cannot continue. 
 Clauses 25 and 26 give applicants the right to apply for housing and all authorities must consider applications from eligible households. Under clause 27, individual households can be de-prioritised in certain circumstances. If the Bill is to stop exclusions, we must look closely at the wording of clause 26, which states that applications must be made in accordance with an authority's allocation scheme. The problem is that that will allow an authority to continue to exclude those who may be in genuine housing need. Of course, it is because the Bill also allows a much more permissive allocations framework that it could extend the number of those who could be excluded through the allocation scheme in a blanket form. 
 If we want authorities to change the way in which they act, the Bill should be more tightly drafted. Amendments Nos. 81 and 82 to clause 26 will provide some of those safeguards. For example, amendment No. 81 clarifies the fact that anyone can apply for housing, strengthening that particular part of clause 26. Amendment No. 82 will require authorities not to frame their scheme in such a way that anyone will be excluded at that stage in the application. 
 I believe, and I hope the Minister will look very carefully at these amendments, that they will prevent people from being excluded at that initial application stage, but not prevent the authority, through clause 27, from being able to de-prioritise or suspend someone individually in exceptional circumstances, where the evidence clearly shows that that should be allowed.

Nigel Waterson: Curiously enough, my remarks on these amendments start where the remarks of the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love) finished, which is on the question of how much difference the amendments would actually make. Looking at our friends from Shelter's excellent, detailed brief on these amendments, looking at the last paragraph before I read the middle paragraph, Shelter make the very point which the hon. Gentleman has just made. That point, as Shelter and I understand it, is that the amendments relate only to the point of application, so there is nothing to stop an authority, even with these amendments incorporated in the Bill, from de-prioritising or suspending applications from an individual applications, once that application has been considered—whether on the basis of antisocial behaviour, rent arrears or anything else.

Andrew Love: I said at the start of my contribution that amendment No. 83 to clause 27 would strengthen the limitation on the way in which people could de-prioritise or suspend applicants, so we should look at amendments Nos. 81 and 82 in conjunction with amendment No. 83. Together, they provide the safeguards to ensure that housing applicants are not treated as they have been up to now.

Nigel Waterson: I am grateful for that and I know you would not wish me to go too far down to the question of amendment No. 83, Mr. Gale, as we will certainly come to that and the major issues to which it relates when we debate clause 27. At least the hon. Gentleman and I agree that, taking amendments Nos. 81 and 82 on their own merits, that seems to be their effect. It is certainly the effect claimed or disclaimed for them by Shelter in its briefing. Having said that, Shelter says, as the hon. Gentleman has suggested, that the amendments are there to strengthen the Bill:
``to ensure that local authorities cannot exclude eligible households from social housing at the point at which an application is made.'' 
In a sense, the debate on the amendments is circular, because an authority that has a strict policy on de-prioritisation could still apply it on the basis of these amendments without prejudice to amendment No. 83, to which will return to on another day. 
 ``Quality and Choice: a Decent Home for All'' makes clear the Government's intention to: 
``remove the scope to impose blanket restrictions preventing groups of people from applying for social housing.'' 
We all have sympathy with that. In any walk of life there is a lot of perceived unfairness if people feel that their individual circumstances have been caught up in some blanket restriction, whatever the true situation may be. Shelter's concern, which I suspect is what brought us to the debate and the amendments, is that clauses 25 and 26 would allow local authorities to continue to have a sort of blanket exemption along the lines that the hon. Gentleman described in proposing the amendments. Shelter thinks that the amendments will ensure that households cannot be unjustifiably excluded again at the application stage. It dwells on four particular areas: outstanding rent arrears, criminal convictions, allegations of antisocial behaviour, and refusing an offer of accommodation from the housing register. 
 If we focus on the first three, we can all agree that substantial rent arrears, or a history of them, with no good reason, such as a problem with the housing benefit system, should be taken into consideration. With regard to criminal convictions, no one would defend a system, as quoted by the hon. Gentleman and by Shelter, where a fine for speeding would count against someone when being housed. Antisocial behaviour is an issue in itself, which will be dealt with in detail under clause 27. Suffice it to say that there clearly can and must be justification for taking account of antisocial behaviour to a certain degree in allocations policies. If people have a serious track record of anti-social behaviour, making their neighbours' lives a misery, they should not simply be moved on to make another set of neighbours' lives a misery. That leads inevitably to the question of what happens to such people, who clearly have to be housed somewhere. However, we cannot simply forget about antisocial behaviour. The Shelter briefing, as one might expect, talks about what it calls ``entirely spurious reasons'' being put forward. Again, one cannot disagree with that. It goes on to say: 
 ``Many authorities operate blanket policies to exclude people with criminal convictions.''
 It refers to one authority that can rely on motoring offences. It also talks about households being excluded for what it calls 
``entirely unproven and unjustified allegations of anti-social behaviour.'' 
Again, in our daily and weekly work as Members of Parliament, we all come across such disputes, whether between neighbours in social housing or owner-occupiers in rather smart streets. They can be equally problematical, and it can be difficult to get at the real truth. Having seen one party to a dispute in my surgery one week, I dread seeing the other party on the rota the following week. Given that we all have to face re-election from time to time, that adds a completely different dimension to arriving at a kind of Solomonesque solution to such problems.

Tim Loughton: An even worse scenario is when both sides of a dispute arrive at the surgery at the same time.

Nigel Waterson: That has never happened to me, thank goodness, but it sounds like a nightmare.
 On a serious note, such appalling situations sometimes blight people's lives for years, yet the police, the local council, the social services and a range of agencies and organisations seem incapable of dealing with a problem. People suffer ill health, mental problems and many other problems. It is no good moving straight on, as Shelter does in its briefing, to talk about social exclusion. If people are simply incapable of living in a social setting with their neighbours, there is a case for social exclusion. 
 The Government's stated aim was to remove those blanket restrictions. I do not honestly believe, for the reasons that I have stated and the reasons set out in Shelter's background briefing, that the amendments have that effect. Shelter says: 
``amendment 81 would strengthen clause 25 so that it clearly states that anyone can apply for housing''.
 It adds: 
``amendment 82 would require authorities not to frame their scheme in such a way as to exclude anyone at the application stage, thereby requiring every application to be considered.'' 
Again, with all due respect to the hon. Member for Edmonton and Shelter, that may be a wholly Pyrrhic victory in terms of helping individuals. 
 I should like to mention a couple of examples that I found interesting in the background briefing from Shelter. It makes the obvious point that the real extent of exclusions from housing is unclear. It is extremely difficult to get reliable figures. It estimates that as many as 200,000 people have been excluded or suspended from social housing and have developed into what it terms an underclass who simply cannot get housed anywhere. I read in one Shelter publication that the whole problem has been aggravated in recent years by the development of joint registers between RSLs and local authorities, which means that people cannot be excluded by one and find their way on to the other. 
 Shelter mentions a mysteriously described ``northern authority'', which 
``in March 1999 had an active rehousing list of over 16,000 households, while over 53,000 were suspended for various reasons . . . The same authority is widely quoted as having a surplus of around 20,000 properties.'' 
Some authorities have quite strong policies on this subject. Without wearying the Committee too much, I shall quote just two examples from the many that Shelter cites. The first states: 
 ``A lone parent with three children applied for housing benefit from her RSL home in February 2000. The local authority lost the claim and refused to accept she had made the claim''— 
a situation we have all come across in our mail bags. 
 ``She then reapplied for housing benefit in May, but was told that it would not be backdated to February. The claim was processed and eventually paid in September. As over £1,000 of rent arrears were outstanding...the RSL sought repossession. She was not represented at the case and the court issued a repossession notice. She applied to the council as homeless. They refused to accept her as `she made herself intentionally homeless' by not paying her debt. She was not allowed to join a housing register as she had over £100 worth of debt. She sought advice from the local Shelter housing advice centre.'' 
Eventually, with its help her debts were cleared and she was accepted as homeless. That shows the Kafkaesque situations that people can get sucked into. 
 Another example states: 
 ``An authority in the north east has suspended a women's application for housing from the register due to arrears, despite the fact that she had been accepted as priority homeless as she had to flee violence from outside the home.'' 
Yes, we support the principle that blanket exclusions, particularly where they produce wholly artificial results, should be looked at again. We do not want to see a situation in which individual cases cannot be taken into account, whether it be individual cases of merit, like the couple that I have just mentioned, or individual cases where there are genuine reasons why people should not be given priority for social housing. That is a wider debate to which we shall return. For all those reasons, not least the first which is that I cannot see that they would make much difference, the Opposition are not minded to support amendments Nos. 81 and 82.

Nick Raynsford: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton for raising an important issue and allowing us an opportunity to consider one of the most complex passages of the Bill. The concepts themselves are not difficult, but the way in which the new Bill relates to the existing legislation is necessarily complex. I said earlier, in a private conversation, that it is relatively easy to write legislation from scratch; it is much more problematic to amend existing legislation—which is what we do in this place most of the time. This Bill is no exception to that.
 My hon. Friend rightly stressed the importance of giving effect to our Green Paper commitment to end blanket policies that exclude whole categories of applicants, arbitrarily and unfairly, from entitlement to housing. I understood the hon. Member for Eastbourne to concur entirely with that objective, which we all want to secure. The hon. Member for Eastbourne raised the reasonable issue of antisocial behaviour. He asked whether an authority should be obliged immediately to rehouse people who have been evicted for making their neighbours' lives a misery—only to cause misery to others? That is a fair and valid question. I do not want to pre-empt the full discussion that we should have on the issue on Thursday—and incur your wrath, Mr. Gale—but we believe that there are mechanisms for ensuring that authorities deal individually with people who have behaved in such a way and for when it is not appropriate to give priority to rehousing. Safeguards can be provided in individual cases without applying a blanket policy. Our objective is to ensure that there are no blanket bans on whole categories of people. 
 The problem was brought home to me graphically in a rather shocking case in one of my constituency surgeries recently. A 19-year-old woman told me that she had been debarred from consideration for council housing because she had been evicted for antisocial behaviour three years earlier. I was shocked that she had had a tenancy of a council property at the age of 16, but it transpired that she had been sharing the tenancy with an older person, her partner at the time—someone with whom she was no longer associated—who had behaved in an extremely unpleasant and antisocial way. I am not making a judgment on the individual case, although I felt that that young woman had a reasonable case for consideration, but the obvious question to ask is whether, where someone has been debarred from consideration because of a previous unsatisfactory pattern of behaviour, that mark of Cain should rest with them for ever or whether there is a point at which he or she can be reconsidered. 
 That is the nub of the individual rather than the blanket approach. A blanket approach makes it quite likely that people will be debarred, not necessarily for ever but for a long period of time, without taking account of changes in attitude, behaviour and circumstances that would justify reconsideration of the case.

Nigel Waterson: Does the Minister accept the other side of that coin that, to encourage better tenant behaviour, consideration may be given to individual cases where there are genuine concerns about people's behaviour? The problem on some estates is often that the system seems to rush to help people who behave badly, while abandoning those who are responsible and do their best.

Nick Raynsford: I agree wholeheartedly that it is absolutely right that all those involved in the management and delivery of housing services should be extremely vigilant about supporting honest, reasonable members of society who find themselves the victims of antisocial behaviour. We introduced the new provisions of the antisocial behaviour orders to give additional powers to local authorities to enable them to take action against people making their neighbours' lives a misery. I wholeheartedly concur that action should be taken.
 However, that is slightly different from the point that I was trying to make—perhaps not as well as I should have done—that people involved in antisocial behaviour at one stage in their lives can change, reform and become law-abiding citizens who should be eligible for consideration in future. The danger of a blanket exclusion is that it might prevent consideration being given to such people. I think that we all agree that it is right, as a policy objective, to try to ensure that local housing authorities cannot operate blanket exclusion policies. That is our intention and I shall not say any more about why we seek that. 
 That is not to say that there will never be circumstances where an authority will have grounds for refusing to allocate accommodation to an applicant, even though it might have vacant properties. Each application must be assessed on its merits. There may be cases where an applicant's previous behaviour and current unwillingness to reform make an authority's refusal perfectly reasonable, but that is an individual consideration, Such decisions require careful consideration. All relevant factors must be balanced, including the degree of housing need, the hardship that will be suffered if accommodation were refused, and the applicant's past and likely future behaviour. Blanket bans preclude such a process, undermining an elementary principle of justice. 
 Amendment No. 81 seeks to provide all eligible applicants with a right to apply. Such a right arises necessarily from the changes that we are making to part VI of the Housing Act 1996 and is expressly recognised in the terminology of new section 166(1)(a) inserted by clause 26. My hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton will recognise that the terminology refers to the right to make an application. That is explicitly recognised in the new Bill. But that provision, like the proposed amendment, only goes so far. What is essential is that any application should be given proper consideration, and that is secured by the new section 166(3), also inserted by clause 26. 
 My hon. Friend asked about new section 166(3) and I shall try to answer my hon. Friend's concern by quoting the clause and interpreting it to the best of my ability. New section 166(3), as inserted by clause 26, states: 
 ``Every application made to a local housing authority for an allocation of housing accommodation shall (if made in accordance with the authority's allocation scheme) be considered by the authority.'' 
There are two points to stress. First, that places an obligation on the local authority to consider every application, and that is part of the framework that prevents blanket bans. Secondly, it ensures that the authority can require people to apply in accordance with a particular arrangement, for example, filling in a form. If someone has not provided the authority with the necessary information by filling in a form, it is released from the obligation to consider it until the person has provided that information. That is the purpose of new section 166(3). It prevents a blanket ban on an individual, or groups of applicants, from being imposed via the back door. It is a procedural arrangement to enable the authority, perfectly reasonably, to require a certain amount of information to be provided upon which it can properly assess an application. To use new section 166(3) as a vehicle for prescribing classes that could be excluded would be entirely unjustified, would be challengeable and would be likely to be struck down as unreasonable. That is all part of the complex process of interpreting the provisions. 
 That brings me to amendment No. 82. Hon. Members are concerned that new section 166(3) and its requirement that applications must be made in accordance with an authority's allocation scheme might be used by an authority to frame its schemes in such a way as to operate a blanket exclusion. On first hearing that argument, I shared their concern, and I asked my officials to consider it carefully. As a result of further advice and detailed discussion, I am now reassured and satisfied that that is not possible. I shall try and take the Committee through this necessarily complex subject to try to satisfy everyone as to why it cannot be used as a vehicle for operating a blanket ban. 
 I start with the current position. Some authorities are operating blanket bans and that is made possible by section 161(4) of the 1996 Act. That is repealed by clause 25 of the Bill. Once that repeal is effected, there is nothing in part VI of the 1996 Act, as amended, that empowers authorities to make blanket exclusions. Only that provision enabled them to do that. A section 167 scheme is about determining priorities and procedures for allocations. I am advised that new section 160A(2), which provides that anyone can be allocated accommodation, and new section 166(1) and (3)—the implicit right to apply and the right to consideration—when read together with section 167, as amended, which is the framework for preferences and priorities, do not permit local authorities to operate blanket exclusions as part of their allocation schemes. An application by an eligible person has to be considered on its merits. He may be accorded greater or lesser priority, but he cannot be excluded from consideration completely. Of course, he may fail to be allocated a property, particularly if authorities adopt provisions such as that in new section 167(2)(a) of the 1996 Act, but that, of course, is a different question. 
 Nevertheless, in view of my hon. Friend's concerns, and bearing in mind the complexity of the issues—I confess that it took me a little time to get my head round them—I am more than happy to look once again at the Bill, in the light of what has been said this evening, to ensure that authorities cannot operate blanket exclusion policies under part VI of the 1996 Act as amended by the Bill. If I am not satisfied, I undertake to bring forward Government amendments to secure that result. However, I hope that, even if the intellectual process was somewhat tortuous, I have shown that there are good grounds for feeling confident that our new provisions achieve our stated policy to prevent blanket bans. With that, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.

Andrew Love: First, I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for the detailed explanation of the various clauses that intertwine on this particular subject. I bow to his superior knowledge. I also thank him for his reassurance that he will look again at the Bill, and that the words:
``if made in accordance with the authority's allocation scheme'' 
in clause 26, new section 166(3), will not allow local authorities in the new permissive regime for allocation schemes to continue with blanket exclusions. That is a difficult and complex area. I will look closely at the record of today's proceedings. No doubt we will talk again about some of those issues, but I am sure that in the end we will achieve the objective of both sides of the Committee of ending blanket bans. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Tom Brake: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in page 15, leave out lines 20 to 25.

Roger Gale: With this we may take amendment No. 74, in page 15, leave out lines 26 to 28.

Tom Brake: I begin by thanking you, Mr. Gale, and other hon. Members for their congratulations. For once, my late nights are nothing to do with the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth). [Laughter.]
 To pursue the serious matters in hand, I rise to support amendments Nos. 73 and 74, which would implement the Government's philosophy set out in the housing Green Paper. That philosophy has been expounded by the hon. Members for Edmonton and for Eastbourne and by the Minister. The housing Green Paper made it clear that the Government intended to remove the power to impose blanket exclusions from the housing register. 
 A blanket exclusion applies to asylum seekers. I am aware of the complexity of the overlap between immigration and housing legislation. The amendment would make a substantial impact and require other legislation to be examined, but it is worthy of debate. 
 Many asylum seekers will have escaped harrowing events in their countries of origin before reaching the United Kingdom. Many subsequently have to undergo the humiliation of poor quality accommodation in this country. One of my constituents was literally sent to Coventry—a wonderful city, but not the best place to live if someone works in Croydon. The accommodation used for asylum seekers is often in the private sector, which can be more expensive than council accommodation. Houses in multiple occupation are also used. Local environmental health officers would be unlikely to approve them if they were informed which properties were being used, but lack of communication between local authorities and the National Asylum Support Service is a real problem. 
 In the case of vouchers-only asylum seekers, severe overcrowding can arise. Someone in my local authority earlier today told me that one of our properties was heavily overcrowded with vouchers-only asylum seekers. The owner had told them that they could use that address, so they would not be moved around the country, but it led to severe overcrowding. 
 If local authorities could build the required social housing—I am afraid that there is nothing in the pipeline yet—and asylum seekers were subject to the same assessment of need, it would be a much fairer system. At the moment, the most vulnerable asylum seekers with the greatest degree of disability are being sent halfway across London to visit the local authority on the rota for doing assessments of need and are then shunted to and fro. That is happening to the asylum seekers who are least able to bear it. 
 Ensuring that asylum seekers follow the same rules of allocation would lead to a fairer system. They would then be subject to an assessment of need that works reasonably well. It might be cheaper than the present heavy reliance on private accommodation and it might even be a safer system in which local authorities would have greater control over accommodation. 
 These are probing amendments. I hope that the Minister will tell us what consideration he has given to the issues and about the reforms that the Government intend to introduce in relation to NASS and the problems that I and many other hon. Members have identified in the system. What reforms are in the pipeline? If nothing is planned, will the Minister reconsider the position of asylum seekers and the rules of housing allocation?

Tim Loughton: For a variety of reasons, we cannot support the Liberal Democrat amendments. First, they would have serious implications for the level of homeless people who did not qualify as asylum seekers and their access to accommodation. Secondly, I think that they would also contravene the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, certainly in spirit if not in practice.
 Recent figures have made us only too aware of the level of the asylum seeker problem. Last year, 76,000 principal applications for asylum were made. The inclusion of dependants takes the number up to virtually 100,000—a 7 per cent. increase on 1999 and the largest number in the European Union. We now represent some 20 per cent. of all asylum seekers in the EU. The figure here is more than double the level of asylum seekers in the United States, despite the terms of the 1999 Act and previous legislation. I gather that the biggest increase is in asylum applications from Iran and Iraq. 
 Most of those applications for asylum were made once the people were in the country. Last year, of 110,000 asylum seeker applications, fewer than 10,000 were recognised as political refugees. Some 66,000 applications by asylum seekers are still in the system, which is a considerably higher number than that left in 1997 by the previous Government, despite all the promises of changes to and investments in the system. 
 That is the context in which the amendments should be judged. This is not only a London issue. I represent a constituency in west Sussex. Local authority figures for the level of asylum seekers show that west Sussex has one of the highest numbers— if not the highest—of all the shire counties in the country, with a much higher level than many London boroughs. The fact that Gatwick airport is in west Sussex is often overlooked. A high number of asylum seekers come through the airport, which puts considerable pressure on local authorities in west Sussex to produce homelessness strategies and on social services and particularly those dealing with refugee children. Social services' budgets have been severely stretched—but I am straying slightly from the subject. 
 Westminster is a central London borough with a high number of asylum seekers. It produced a report about a year ago, but the examples that it gave are still relevant. Westminster highlights the cost of temporary accommodation in the capital that is used for housing asylum seekers among others, and the enormous rise in the cost of temporary accommodation. According to the report, London Research Centre figures show that the average nightly cost per homeless household of bed-and-breakfast accommodation has risen from £38.70 in 1997 to £46.60 in 1998—an increase of 20 per cent. in only one year. That trend has continued.

Karen Buck: In the light of those figures, I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman would join me in warmly welcoming the special grant that was announced yesterday, which the Minister had a hand in delivering? It will provide at least £25 million to health authorities, precisely like Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, which are facing the real problem of accommodating asylum seekers in very high value property.

Tim Loughton: Precisely like Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, but precisely not like west Sussex, which as I have said, has a very high level of asylum seekers. The amount received in my county was negligible. The pressure on resources is considerable. Money is being taken by social services for those reasons, quite aside from the homelessness problem. It means that money is being taken away from the education budget and from social services provision for elderly people of which west Sussex has the highest level of any county in the country. The hon. Member for Regents Park and Kensington, North (Ms Buck) may well want to triumph at that figure, and I would join in her congratulations if there were a rather greater spread of those spoils around other parts of the country that do not happen to be Labour areas but which do have considerable problems. The impact on the marginal London seats around Westminster, as the Minister knows, is considerable, yet in west Sussex we do not get those benefits.
 In April 2000 the Home Office introduced the new dispersal system where local authorities and housing associations across the country assist the Home office in assessing accommodation. The problem with those new arrangements is that they do not deal with the housing needs of asylum seekers currently accommodated by the London boroughs. As the backlog of asylum seekers currently awaiting a decision on their application is reduced, many more asylum seekers will qualify for permanent housing. The figures in the report show that, currently, 689 asylum seekers in Westminster are being accommodated under Housing Act duties. My interpretation of the Liberal Democrat amendment is that it would place a much greater duty back on local authorities to deal with asylum seekers. That would greatly increase the queues of asylum seekers, alongside other priority homeless cases such as those we have been discussing.

Tom Brake: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman noted my reference to the fact that local authorities would need greater resources should the amendment be accepted. These amendments touch on the quality of housing provided for asylum seekers. Does he believe asylum seekers should be housed in accommodation that is not fit for human habitation? Does he believe that poor quality housing should be used as a deterrent for potential asylum seekers?

Tim Loughton: Not at all. That was not my point and it is not the point of the amendment. It does not deal with the quality of the accommodation. In clause 25(2) it seeks to strike out subsections (3) and (4) of the proposed new section 160, which relate to people covered by Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman knows what his amendments are about. I have already made the case for a fairer distribution of the additional resources, but yet again the Liberal Democrats make a case for additional resources without telling us from where those additional resources are to be funded.

Don Foster: Will the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that if asylum seekers are not eligible to access the local authority route to accommodation, they will have to fall back on whatever accommodation they can find? That often means that, because of the pressures on housing to which my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington referred, they are forced into lower quality accommodation. The issue is very much about housing quality for asylum seekers.

Tim Loughton: Under the new arrangements, post April 2000, the dispersal is operated through the Home Office. We are told that greater resources are being put into that and, hopefully, advantage can be taken of areas in which there is less pressure on accommodation and the standard of accommodation is adequate to deal with all homeless people, let alone asylum seekers. However, we still do not know where the additional resources that Liberal Democrats always tag from their one penny on income tax are going to come from, unless they are reintroducing a problem which the two asylum Acts did at least try to address. I am sure that Minister agrees.
 We cannot see how the amendments would help. They would only add to the pressure on local authorities dealing with the other categories of priority homeless that we discussed earlier. As such, I do not think they would be a helpful addition to the Bill. If the Minister is minded to reject them, as I think he is, he will receive our support in doing so.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington expressed concern about the current arrangements for asylum seekers. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham expressed a rather different view about the pressures imposed by asylum seekers. We covered that issue in some detail this morning and I do not propose to repeat what I said then, other than to point out that this country has a long tradition of having provided a safe haven for people who have suffered persecution and serious misfortune in other countries. That policy remains very much the same today. I, like most members of this Committee, know from personal experience the number of asylum seekers who have been welcomed into this country, often after having suffered appalling persecution. The hon. Gentleman referred to the middle east and I can personally testify to some appalling examples of people who have been tortured by the Saddam regime and who have found a safe haven in this country. I am proud that we continue to provide that necessary provision.
 Nevertheless, it is important that we put the issue in perspective, because the provisions that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington proposes are not limited to asylum seekers: they make changes to the rules relating to persons subject to immigration control. Most persons subject to immigration control are not asylum seekers, but are short-term visitors and persons given leave to enter the United Kingdom on the condition that they do not have recourse to public funds. It would be utterly preposterous to undermine that provision by making the amendments, because to do so would contradict the whole of Government policy on immigration. We cannot seriously entertain such a proposition. 
 There is no question of any change in Government policy. The provisions are necessary because of the change effected by the Bill, which does away with the provision for a housing register. It is therefore necessary to have a new statement of the existing policy, which is achieved by the provisions that the amendments would amend. On the basis that the measure is a simple continuation of existing policy, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister for his response. I will withdraw my amendments. However, I shall continue to monitor the existing arrangements and hope that, if he hears about problems, the Minister will propose suitable improvements. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 75, page 15, line 46, at end insert—
 `(9) The notice shall also inform him of his right to request a review of the decision and of the time within which such a request must be made.
 (10) A request for review must be made before the end of a period of 21 days beginning with the day on which he is notified of the authority's decisions and reasons, or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow.
 (11) There is no right to request a review of the decision reached on an earlier review.
 (12) On a request being duly made to them, the authority shall review their decision.'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to take the following: New Clause 5—Procedure on a review—
 `.—(1) The Secretary of State may make provision by regulations as to the procedure to be followed in connection with a review under section 160A and nothing in the following provisions affects the generality of this power.
 (2) Provision may be made by regulations—
(a) requiring the decision on review to be made by a person of appropriate seniority who was not involved in the original decision, and
(b) as to the circumstances in which the person concerned is entitled to an oral hearing, and whether and by whom he may be represented at such a hearing.
 (3) The authority shall notify the person concerned of the decision on the review.
 (4) If the decision is to confirm the original decision, they shall also notify him of the reasons for the decision.
 (5) Provision may be made by regulations as to the period within which the review must be carried out and notice given of the decision.
 (6) Notice required to be given to a person under this section shall be given in writing and, if not received by him, shall be treated as having been given if it is made available at the authority's office for a reasonable period for collection by him.'.
 New clause 6—Right of appeal to county court on point of law— 
 `.—(1) Section 204 (right of appeal to county court on point of law) of the 1996 Act is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2), at the end there is inserted ``or such longer period as the authority and the applicant may agree or as the court may allow.'' 
 (3) In subsection (4)— 
 (a) for ``may'' there is substituted ``shall'' 
 (b) at the end there is inserted— 
 ``If the local authority is satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success in an appeal under this section, it shall notify the applicant accordingly. In any such case, the applicant may apply to the court to require the authority to secure that accommodation is available in accordance with the provisions of this section.''.'. 
New clause 11—Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need— 
 `( ).—(1) Section 188 (interim duty to accommodate in case of a apparent priority need) of the 1996 Act is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (3) at the end there is inserted— 
 ``in any case where the authority are satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success in the review''. 
 (3) After subsection (3) the words ``The authority may continue to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a decision on a review'' shall cease to have effect.'.

Don Foster: The amendments highly technical and will need careful explanation. I apologise in advance if I stretch the Committee's patience, but I must explain clearly and precisely why they are important.
 Sometimes when considering legislation that changes existing legislation, we can throw away some of the good bits of the legislation almost by mistake. The general purpose of the group of amendments is to address one such case, because I genuinely believe that the new proposals will remove important safeguards. That is particularly true of amendment No. 75 and new clause 5, but also applies to new clauses 6 and 11. I believe that the Government have not gone far enough to improve matters that they sought to improve in their amendments to the Housing Act 1996. 
 Amendment No. 75 and new clause 5 would amend the Bill to include a right of review of local authority decisions on the allocation of accommodation at two points in the allocations process: first, when decisions are taken on eligibility and, secondly, when decisions are taken to reduce the priority given to an application. The amendment would introduce a right of review of decisions on whether an applicant is eligible for consideration under an authority's allocation scheme. The Bill sets out the same criteria for local authorities to use in determining eligibility as the 1996 Act; asylum seekers and others subject to immigration control are not eligible to be considered. However, in sweeping away much of the old allocations framework, the Bill also removes the right of review on decisions of eligibility contained in section 164 of the 1996 Act. 
 The rules on eligibility are enormously complicated. The Department's guidance to local authorities includes 45 pages of explanation and there is no single formula that can be applied. Case law illustrates the changing situation, not least as it affects individual cases, and there is the added complication of different interpretations in the European Court of Justice. To illustrate the complexity, I remind the Committee that most asylum seekers are ineligible, which is what the Government intend. However, if an asylum seeker is from a country with which the United Kingdom has an agreement on reciprocal social security rights, he or she may be eligible. For example, asylum seekers from Turkey may be eligible because Turkey is a signatory to the Council of Europe social charter. 
 There are many other complications. For example, a common error made by some authorities is to rule that someone with exceptional leave to remain is ineligible, even though such people are entitled to apply under the complex eligibility criteria. There is a complex set of arrangements for eligibility but no right of review if someone is declared ineligible, thus denying a basic human right. 
 New clause 5 would introduce a right of review of a decision to give low priority to an application. That is complicated because the Bill makes significant changes to the way in which social housing is allocated, not least by removing the requirement to maintain a housing register, and introduces the right to apply for accommodation. Under a number of criteria, the Bill, therefore, allows a local authority to use its discretion to give lower priority to some individuals. Those criteria include rent arrears, allegations of excessive noise and antisocial behaviour. 
 The 1996 Act gives applicants a right of review when they are excluded from the register as a result of those criteria being applied. I acknowledge that there is no right of review when the applicant is merely suspended from the register but it exists for those who are taken off the register. 
 It strikes me as wrong that a right of review has been removed in what could be contentious cases. Applications may be denied because applicants have not paid their rent, even when they have not done so because housing benefit has not been received. I suspect that Committee members will be familiar with that situation from their constituency surgeries. If no right of review exists, there is no opportunity for such applicants to make their case. The purpose of new clause 5 is to reinstate the right of review that existed in the 1996 Act. 
 Hon. Members may be concerned that the new clause will lead to a large number of such cases. However, the Department's research, which examined the arrangements under part VI of the 1996 Act, demonstrates that only a small number of such cases arose. Very few reviews were sought but, significantly, when they were sought, about 50 per cent. of decisions were overturned. That shows that when local authorities examined cases closely and had access to additional information provided by the applicant, they discovered that mistakes had been made; perhaps more information came to light that proved that rent arrears had occurred due to non-payment of housing benefit. Mistakes are made, and they can be rectified in a review. New clause 5 is important in those circumstances. 
 New clauses 6 and 11 deal with decisions about homelessness, such as whether the applicant has a priority need or whether he or she is intentionally homeless. Those issues are covered in part VII of the 1996 Act and the two new clauses seek to build on that legislation. 
 The 1996 Act allows an applicant a right of review of homelessness decisions taken by a local authority. The applicant can go further and appeal to the county court on a point of law if the application is unsuccessful. The local authority also has the power, not the duty, to accommodate an applicant during the review and appeal process. New clause 11 argues that local authorities should be required to accommodate an applicant—except in what might be deemed hopeless cases—pending the review of a homelessness decision. New clause 6 would extend, in certain circumstances, the fixed 21-day time limit that is currently allowed for lodging an appeal with the county court. As with new clause 11, it would also require a local authority to provide accommodation pending an appeal of a homelessness decision, except in hopeless cases. 
 There is much confusion about the appeal and review process. If the person we talked about earlier were given 24 hours in which to decide about a final offer of accommodation, refused the offer and was then removed from the list of people whom the local authority must help, that person could appeal. If he were unsuccessful in that appeal, that would be the end of it: he would have to fend for himself. However, if that person were to accept the offer, despite being unsure about it, the current arrangements would allow him to appeal anyway. 
 The arrangements are unfair, and that leads to complications. Our proposals would solve some of the difficulties. No one benefits from such difficulties: neither the person appealing for help, nor the local authority that might be required to give it. New clause 11 requires the authority to provide accommodation pending the review of the authority's decision under the homelessness legislation. 
 We know that the existing legislation empowers local authorities to provide accommodation but the evidence shows that that power is rarely used. It is difficult for people seeking reviews if they are not housed. In most cases, they will give up and move somewhere else, which means that the review will never take place. The vast majority of reviews simply never happen because people give up when the local authority fails to provide accommodation. That causes additional difficulties, because such people are back to square one, which can affect their mental and physical health, and further increase their vulnerability. They might present to another local authority later, starting the process all over again. 
 I hope that the Minister will accept that argument and recognise that the problem does not concern only the time in which people have to request a review. If a review is granted, the authority has eight weeks to decide. People could wait three months, and sometimes more, without any accommodation while the review takes place. It is a long time to wait and, as I said, most people decide not to bother. 
 A requirement on the local authority to provide accommodation during the review period would provide greater opportunity for reviews to go ahead and to check whether the right decision was made in the first place. I stress that there should not be a blanket requirement because there will be reviews that, in the local authority's view, have no chance of success. New clause 11 would provide a get-out clause for the local authority. 
 New clause 6 has two purposes: first, to provide an opportunity to extend the 21-day limit and, secondly, to provide that the local authority shall make accommodation available, pending an appeal. The combination of such a rigid time limit and lack of accommodation is a huge detriment to an individual who is seeking an appeal to the county court on a point of law. The situation was easier before the 1996 Act and the leave for judicial review following the case of R. vs. Cardiff city council ex parte Barry in 1989, which I mentioned privately to the Minister earlier. At that time, the ``usual concomitant'' to pursuing an appeal was that temporary accommodation would continue to be provided to an applicant. 
 People will have little or no opportunity to take their case to appeal if improvements to the legislation are not made. There are four separate measures in the amendment and new clauses. The first two are designed to put back measures that have been swept away—perhaps by mistake—by the Government's proposed changes to the 1996 Act. They provide an opportunity to reconsider eligibility or the status of the appeal. The other proposals would extend current legislation to give a genuine opportunity to review homelessness cases and to allow county court appeals so that mistakes can be rectified.

Nigel Waterson: I shall be brief. I do not think that the hon. Member for Bath could be accused of taking short cuts in his speech. He usefully dealt with the points from the Shelter briefing, and, no doubt, one or two others. We share some of his concerns and our starred amendments Nos. 103 and 104 have a similar thrust to some of his proposals.
 It is a matter of principle that, whatever detailed system is put in place for social housing allocation policies, it must be transparent. Applicants should be clear about whether they are eligible for housing, for what type and in what area; how to apply for it; how priority is awarded; and how to appeal or seek a review if they are not satisfied. They must also be clear about the information that they are entitled to receive during the process. 
 As the hon. Member for Bath said, we are discussing the 1996 Act. Section 164 gives the right to a review of an authority's decision to exclude a person from the housing register. Section 204 gives an applicant the right of appeal to the county court on a point of law if the review finds against him. Section 202 allows a right of review of an authority's decision under the homelessness provisions. 
 We are not the only people who are concerned. At the meeting of the all-party homelessness and housing group to discuss the Bill on 15 January, Mr. Chris Holmes, the director of Shelter, described the removal of the right of appeal as a ``cause for concern''. We share that concern. Shelter eloquently set out its concerns in its briefing, and the hon. Member for Bath has, perhaps less eloquently, taken us through that. 
 I refer again to the LGA report ``No Place Like Home''. It says that 
 ``The key criterion for allocation schemes is the need for a transparent and fair system in which applicants are kept fully informed and which ensures sufficient flexibility at local level in order to balance the needs and rights of both the individual and the local community.'' 
We agree with that as a principle, and do not see how the part that relates to the right of the individual can be maintained by removing the right of appeal and review. We therefore support the amendment and new clauses proposed by the hon. Member for Bath.

Nick Raynsford: The amendment and new clauses relate to appeals against decisions by a local housing authority about an applicant's eligibility for housing accommodation, and to duties owed to the applicant by the authority. The issues are complex and I will address each in detail.
 I first make some general points. It is difficult to achieve the balance between securing robust rights to review and ensuring that review arrangements do not become too unwieldy, protracted and costly. We want a framework that allows unsound or borderline decisions to be reconsidered effectively but does not provide perverse incentives to request reviews that have little prospect of success. That is not easy—there are no perfect solutions. 
 I am reluctant to accept amendments that would force authorities to continue to secure accommodation for those seeking reviews of decisions. It is right that local authorities should have the discretion to make such arrangements, but they should use that discretion reasonably. 
 Amendment No. 75 would enable an applicant whom the local authority had found to be ineligible for allocation of housing accommodation to request a review of that decision. New clause 5 would empower the Secretary of State to specify by order the procedure to be undertaken in such a review. 
 The purpose of clause 25 is to establish eligibility for allocation of housing accommodation. The broad principle—discussed in the previous debate—is that all are eligible except certain persons subject to immigration control and persons within a class prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State. Those exceptions correspond with those in section 161 of the Housing Act 1996, which apply to qualification for the housing register. However, unlike the ``qualifying persons'' provision of that section, new section 160A gives local housing authorities no discretion to determine classes of eligible or ineligible persons. That is an important point. 
 A local housing authority will have to decide, first, whether an applicant comes within the statutory exclusion in new section 160A(3)—that is, whether he or she is subject to immigration control—and, if so, whether he or she falls within any of the exceptions to that prescribed by regulations made under the same subsection. For example, current exceptions include persons who have indefinite or exceptional leave to remain in the UK, as the hon. Member for Bath pointed out. 
 Secondly, the authority must decide whether a person who does not fall within the terms of 160A(3)—that is, he or she is not subject to immigration control—falls within another class of ineligible person prescribed by regulations made under new section 160A(5). Those dealt with under the equivalent current regulations, made under section 161(3) of the 1996 Act, are applicants not habitually resident in the common travel area—the UK, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland. 
 An authority will have to apply the provision made in primary or secondary legislation to the facts of each case. Authorities do such things every day across the range of their functions. If an applicant were to contact an authority and show that relevant facts might have been misunderstood or that a wrong decision might have been reached for some other reason, I hope and expect that the authority would have another look at the case—effectively, review it. That is good administration and we shall say more about it in guidance. 
 If an authority failed to do that or, having looked at it again, did not change its view, it would be open to the applicant to bring judicial review proceedings if he could show that the authority had misdirected itself by taking wrong factors into account, failing to take account of relevant ones, or contravening the well-known principles of administrative law. That is the general remedy for such cases. We have not yet reached the point where local authority decision making is subject across the board to statutory review procedures laid down by central Government. I suspect that most hon. Members would not want us to.

Don Foster: The Minister is beginning to acknowledge that judicial review is hardly an option for most people, for some of the reasons that I gave. Given that he said that he would hope and expect a local authority, when challenged, in effect to review a case, and that the Housing Act 1996 provides for review, why is he now seeking to remove that provision, given that it is what he wants to happen?

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman is not following my argument, or perhaps I have not expressed it clearly. Unlike the 1996 Act, the Bill offers no scope for a local authority to apply blanket exclusions that it determines itself. There is no such discretion for the local authority, as there was under the 1996 Act. That was, properly, subject to a review. Under the exclusions to which I have been referring, the local authority has to apply the law in relation to the facts of each case. If it does so correctly, it would be preposterous for someone to seek a review of such a decision. I am afraid that the arrangements that the hon. Gentleman proposes would encourage such reviews.

Don Foster: What would happen in the case of the Turkish person I described earlier? Although complicated, the legislation makes it clear that an asylum seeker from Turkey is eligible. If the local authority did not understand that, made a mistake and deemed that person to be ineligible, what course of action would be available to that individual to take the matter forward? The Minister's answer is judicial review. Is that the case?

Nick Raynsford: Like me, the hon. Gentleman must have dealt with many applicants who question whether their local authority has correctly interpreted the law, not on an area of discretion but on the application of a point of law. I normally advise people to seek legal advice from a solicitor if they have the means to do so. If not, they should go to a law centre, which will give free advice. I have good relations with my law centre and no doubt the hon. Gentleman does with similar organisations in Bath. That normally produces a short, sharp letter to the authority reminding it of the legal position, which leads rapidly to a reversal of the decision.
 That is very different from a request for a review of an area where the local authority has the discretion to take a decision. The problem with applying a review procedure to an area where the authority is correctly applying the law is that one is encouraging people who are ineligible because of the law to seek a review of something that cannot be reviewed. That would create a cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming appeal procedure for no good purpose, as I tried to explain earlier. 
 Where the finding of ineligibility on statutory grounds is clearly correct, I see no reason to provide a mechanism allowing an appeal against that decision. Under the new provisions, unlike section 161 of the Housing Act 1996, we are not concerned with local authorities applying their own policy discretion with respect to exclusion from allocation. Rather than go down the road proposed by the hon. Gentleman, I think it best to rely on authorities to follow the principle of good administration, with the possibility of judicial review if they get it wrong and ignore the letter from the law centre, to which I have just referred. 
 New clause 6 seeks to amend the provisions on the right of appeal to a county court on a point of law under section 204 of the 1996 Act. It would allow for an extension of the appeal period, which is currently 21 days. It would place an obligation on authorities to continue to secure accommodation for an applicant, under sections 188, 190 and 200 of the Act, during the period in which an appeal could be lodged and during the hearing of any appeal. 
 The current 21-day period for an applicant to decide whether to appeal is not unreasonable, and it provides authorities with some assurance that decisions will be made in timely fashion. Nor am I persuaded that the discretionary power that authorities currently have to continue to secure accommodation for applicants who appeal against adverse provisions is inappropriate. A similar proposal is made in new clause 11. 
 New clause 11 would, in some cases, have the effect of placing a duty on authorities to secure accommodation for an applicant to whom they have concluded that they either did not owe a duty or owed one of the lesser duties. It would affect applicants who request a review of the authority's decision on their case where the authority is not reasonably certain that its decision will be upheld by the review. 
 Authorities already have the power to continue to secure accommodation for an applicant pending a decision on a review, and I would expect an authority to use that power if it had doubts about what decision might be reached. However, the amendment would deprive authorities of their right to exercise discretion, and that goes too far. Authorities should take care when making judgments, and I would not expect them to reach manifestly unbalanced conclusions, but it would be unreasonable to limit an authority's right to exercise discretion and replace it with the precise test that is proposed by the hon. Gentleman. To do that would also encourage more appeals against authorities' decisions and have resource implications for authorities, which might result, in some cases, in the perverse consequence of applicants with lesser needs securing accommodation ahead of those with greater needs. 
 As ever, it is essential to get the balance right. The new clause pushes the test too far against the efforts of reasonable authorities to make fair and balanced judgments. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Don Foster: I thank the Minister for his response, disappointing though it was. However, he made some interesting points. I shall reflect on them, in particular on his strenuous use of the argument that if a local authority has no discretion in a matter, there is no need for a review process. The corollary of that is that if a local authority can exercise discretion in a matter, a review process is needed. I am, therefore, surprised that he has chosen to lump together, for example, amendment No. 75 and new clause 5, because local authorities have much discretion about the level of priority that is given to applications. One of the purposes of the Bill is to maintain within the legislation the range of circumstances that are covered in proposed new subsection (2A) in clause 27(3), which states that local authorities have the opportunity to consider
``(a) the financial resources available to a person to meet his housing costs; 
 (b) any behaviour of a person (or of a member of his household) which affects his suitability to be a tenant; 
 (c) any local connection (within the meaning of section 199) which exists between a person and the authority's district.'' 
Local authorities have much opportunity to exercise their discretion. For example, as the Minister will be aware, a quarter of local authorities that use rent reviews as a way of reducing a person's priority have no specific written guidance about the level of arrears that should be taken into account. The same is true for some of the other criteria to which I have referred. 
 Bearing in mind the time, I will take the matter away to reflect on the illogicality of the Minister's argument—a logic that leads him to say that amendment No. 75 is inappropriate, but, at the same time, to reject new clause 5.

Nick Raynsford: Let me the hon. Gentleman in the nicest possible way that, as I understand it, new clause 5(5) covers eligibility rather than the actual process of allocation. That is a different issue and one on which he will perhaps reflect in the days ahead.

Don Foster: I am grateful to the Minister, but I hope that he will reflect on his interpretation of the amendment. I am encouraged if the Minister is indicating that his interpretation might be incorrect and that he might support me. To allow time for the Committee to reflect, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Kevin Hughes.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 1 February at fifteen minutes to Ten o'clock.